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DUALITY AND OPTIMAL STRATEGIES IN THE FINITELY
REPEATED ZERO-SUM GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE
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BERNARD DE MEYER & ALEXANDRE MARINO
MARCH 20, 2005
Abstract. The recursive formula for the value of the zero-sum repeated
games with incomplete information on both sides is known for a long time.
As it is explained in the paper, the usual proof of this formula is in a sense
non constructive: it just claims that the players are unable to guarantee
a better payoff than the one prescribed by the formula, but it does not
indicates how the players can guarantee this amount.
In this paper we aim to give a constructive approach to this formula using
duality techniques. This will allow us to recursively describe the optimal
strategies in those games and to apply these results to games with infinite
action spaces.
1. Introduction
This paper is devoted to the analysis of the optimal strategies in the repeated
zero-sum game with incomplete information on both sides in the independent
case. These games were introduced by Aumann, Maschler [1] and Stearns [7].
The model is described as follows: At an initial stage, nature choses as pair of
states (k, l) in (K ×L) with two independent probability distributions p, q on
K and L respectively. Player 1 is then informed of k but not of l while, on the
contrary, player 2 is informed of l but not of k. To each pair (k, l) corresponds
a matrix Alk := [A
l,j
k,i]i,j in RI×J , where I and J are the respective action sets
of player 1 and 2, and the game Alk is the played during n consecutive rounds:
at each stage m = 1, . . . , n, the players select simultaneously an action in their
respective action set: im ∈ I for player 1 and jm ∈ J for player 2. The pair
(im, jm) is then publicly announced before proceeding to the next stage. At
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. 91A05, 91A10, 91A15, 91A20.
Key words and phrases. repeated games, dual games, incomplete information, recurrence
formula.
address: CERMSEM, Universite´ Paris 1-Panthe´on Sorbonne
Maison des Sciences Economiques — 106-112, Bd de l’Hoˆpital, 75013 Paris .
1
2 BERNARD DE MEYER & ALEXANDRE MARINO
the end of the game, player 2 pays
∑n
m=1A
l,jm
k,im
to player 1. The previous
description is common knowledge to both players, including the probabilities
p, q and the matrices Alk.
The game thus described is denoted Gn(p, q).
Let us first consider the finite case where K, L, I, and J are finite sets. For
a finite set I, we denote by ∆(I) the set of probability distribution on I. We
also denote by hm the sequence (i1, j1, . . . , im, jm) of moves up to stage m so
that hm ∈ Hm := (I × J)m.
A behavior strategy σ for player 1 in Gn(p, q) is then a sequence σ =
(σ1, . . . , σn) where σm : K × Hm−1 → ∆(I). σm(k, hm−1) is the probability
distribution used by player 1 to select his action at round m, given his previ-
ous observations (k, hm−1). Similarly, a strategy τ for player 2 is a sequence
τ = (τ1, . . . , τn) where τm : L×Hm−1 → ∆(J). A pair (σ, τ) of strategies, join
to the initial probabilities (p, q) on the sates of nature induces a probability
Πn(p,q,σ,τ)on (K × L×Hn). The payoff of player 1 in this game is then:
gn(p, q, σ, τ) := EΠn
(p,q,σ,τ)
[
n∑
m=1
Al,jmk,im ],
where the expectation is taken with respect to Πn(p,q,σ,τ). We will define V n(p, q)
and V n(p, q) as the best amounts guaranteed by player 1 and 2 respectively:
V n(p, q) = sup
σ
inf
τ
gn(p, q, σ, τ) and V n(p, q) = inf
τ
sup
σ
gn(p, q, σ, τ)
The functions V n and V n are continuous, concave in p and convex in q. They
satisfy to V n(p, q) ≤ V n(p, q). In the finite case, it is well known that, the game
Gn(p, q) has a value Vn(p, q) wich means that V n(p, q) = V n(p, q) = Vn(p, q).
Futhermore both players have optimal behavior strategies σ∗ and τ ∗:
V n(p, q) = inf
τ
gn(p, q, σ
∗, τ) and V n(p, q) = sup
σ
gn(p, q, σ, τ
∗)
Let us now turn to the recursive structure of Gn(p, q): a strategy σ =
(σ1, . . . , σn+1) in Gn+1(p, q) may be seen as a pair (σ1, σ
+) where
σ+ = (σ2, . . . , σn+1)
is in fact a strategy in a game of lenght n depending on the first moves (i1, j1).
Similarly, a strategy τ for player 2 is viewed as τ = (τ1, τ
+).
Let us now consider the probability pi (resp. λ) on (K × I) (resp. (L× J))
induced by (p, σ1) (resp. (q, τ1)). Let us denote by s the marginal distribution
of pi on I and let pi1 be the conditional probability on K given i1. Similarly, let
t the marginal distribution of λ on J and let qj1 be the conditional probability
on L given j1.
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The payoff gn+1(p, q, σ, τ) may then be computed as follows: the expecta-
tion of the first stage payoff is just g1(p, q, σ1, τ1). Conditioned on i1, j1, the
expectation of the n following terms is just gn(p
i1 , qj1 , σ+(i1, j1), τ
+(i1, j1)).
Therefore:
(1) gn+1(p, q, σ, τ) = g1(p, q, σ1, τ1)+
∑
i1,j1
si1tj1gn(p
i1 , qj1 , σ+(i1, j1), τ
+(i1, j1)).
At a first glans, if σ, τ are optimal in Gn+1(p, q), this formula suggests that
σ+(i1, j1) and τ
+(i1, j1) should be optimal strategies in Gn(p
i1 , qj1), leading to
the following recursive formula :
Theorem 1.1.
Vn+1 = T (Vn) = T (Vn)
with the recursive operators T and T defined as follows:
T (f)(p, q) = sup
σ1
inf
τ1
{
g1(p, q, σ1, τ1) +
∑
i1,j1
si1tj1f(p
i1 , qj1)
}
T (f)(p, q) = inf
τ1
sup
σ1
{
g1(p, q, σ1, τ1) +
∑
i1,j1
si1tj1f(p
i1 , qj1)
}
The usual proof of this theorem is as follows: When playing a best reply to a
strategy σ of player 1 in Gn+1(p, q), player 2 is supposed to know the strategy
σ1. Since he is also aware of his own strategy τ1, he may compute both a
posteriori pi1 and qj1 . If he then plays τ+(i1, j1) a best reply in Gn(p
i1 , qj1)
against σ+(i1, j1), player 1 will get less than V n(p
i1 , qj1) in the n last stages of
Gn+1(p, q). Since player 2 can still minimize the procedure on τ1, we conclude
that the strategy σ of player 1 guarantees a payoff less than T (V n)(p, q). In
other words, V n+1 ≤ T (V n). A symmetrical argument leads to V n+1 ≥ T (V n).
Next, observe that ∀f : T (f) ≥ T (f). So, using the fact that Gn has a value
Vn, we get:
V n+1 ≥ T (V n) = T (Vn) ≥ T (Vn) = T (V n) ≥ V n+1
Since Gn+1 has also a value: Vn+1 = V n+1 = V n+1, the theorem is proved.
This proof of the recursive formula is by no way constructive: it just claims
that player 1 is unable to guarantee more than T (V n)(p, q), but it does not
provide a strategy of player 1 that guarantee this amount.
To explain this in other words, the only strategy built in the last proof is a
reply τ of player 2 to a given strategy of player 1. Let us call τ ◦ this reply of
player 2 to an optimal strategy σ∗ of player 1. τ ◦ is a best reply of player 2
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against σ∗, but it could fail to be an optimal strategy of player 2. Indeed, it
prescribes to play from the second stage on a strategy τ+(i1, j1) which is an
optimal strategy in Gn(p
∗i1 , qj1), where p∗i1 is the conditional probability on K
given that player 1 has used σ∗1 to select i1. So, if player 1 deviates from σ
∗, the
true a posteriori pi1 induced by the deviation may differ from p∗i1 and player 2
will still use the strategy τ+(i1, j1) which could fail to be optimal inGn(p
i1 , qj1).
So when playing against τ ◦, player 1 could have profitable deviations from σ∗.
τ ◦ would therefore not be an optimal strategy. An example of this kind, where
player 2 has no optimal strategy based on the a posteriori p∗i1 is presented in
exercise 4, in chapter 5 of [5].
An other problem with the previous proof is that it assumes that Gn+1(p, q)
has a value. This is always the case for finite games. For games with infinite
sets of actions however, it is tempting to deduce the existence of the value of
Gn+1(p, q) from the existence of a value in Gn, using the recursive structure.
This is the way we proceed in [4]. This would be impossible with the argument
in previous proof: we could only deduce that V n+1 ≥ T (Vn) ≥ T (Vn) ≥ V n+1,
but we could not conclude to the equality V n+1 = V n+1!
Our aim in this paper is to provide optimal strategies in Gn+1(p, q).
We will prove in theorem 3.2 that V n+1 ≥ T (V n) by providing a strategy of
player 1 that guarantees this amount. Symmetrically, we provide a strategy of
player 2 that guarantees him T (V n), and so T (V n) ≥ V n+1.
Since in the finite case, we know by theorem 1.1 that T (V n) = Vn+1 =
T (V n), these strategies are optimal.
These results are also useful for games with infinite action sets: provide one
can argue that T (Vn) = T (Vn), one deduces recursively the existence of the
value for Gn+1(p, q), since
(2) T (Vn) = T (V n) ≥ V n+1 ≥ V n+1 ≥ T (V n) = T (Vn).
Since our aim is to prepare the last section of the paper where we analyze
the infinite action space games, where no general min-max theorem applies to
guarantee the existence of Vn, we will deal with the finite case as if V n and V n
were different functions. Even more, care will be taken in our proofs for the
finite case to never use a ”min-max” theorem that would not applies in the
infinite case.
The dual games were introduced in [2] and [3] for games with incomplete
information on one side to describe recursively the optimal strategies of the
uninformed player. In games with incomplete information on both sides, both
players are partially uninformed. We introduce the corresponding dual games
in the next section.
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2. The dual games
Let us first consider the amount guaranteed by a strategy σ of player 1 in
Gn(p, q). With obvious notations, we get:
inf
τ
gn(p, q, σ, τ) = inf
τ=(τ1,...,τL)
∑
l
ql ·gn(p, l, σ, τ l) =
∑
l
ql ·yl(p, σ) = 〈q, y(p, σ)〉,
where 〈·, ·〉 stands for the euclidean product in RL, and
yl(p, σ) := inf
τ l
gn(p, l, σ, τ
l).
The definition of V n(p, q) indicates that
∀p, q : 〈q, y(p, σ)〉 = inf
τ
gn(p, q, σ, τ) ≤ V n(p, q),
and the equality 〈q, y(p, σ)〉 = V n(p, q) holds if and only if σ is optimal in
Gn(p, q). In particular, 〈q, y(p, σ)〉 is then a tangent hyperplane at q of the
convex function q → V n(p, q).
In the following ∂V n(p, q) will denote the under-gradient at q of that func-
tion:
∂V n(p, q) := {y|∀q′ : V n(p, q′) ≥ V n(p, q) + 〈q′ − q, y〉}
Our previous discussion indicates that if σ is optimal in Gn(p, q), then
y(p, σ) ∈ ∂V n(p, q).
As it will appear in the next section, the relevant question to design re-
cursively optimal strategies is as follows: given an affine functional f(q) =
〈y, q〉+ α such that
(3) ∀q : f(q) ≤ Vn(p, q),
is there a strategy σ such that
(4) ∀q : f(q) ≤ 〈y(p, σ), q〉?
To answer this question it is useful to consider the Fenchel transform in q
of the convex function q → V n(p, q): For y ∈ RL, we set:
V ∗n(p, y) := sup
q
〈q, y〉 − V n(p, q)
As a supremum of convex functions, the function V ∗n is then convex in (p, y)
on ∆(K)× RL.
For relation (3) to hold, one must then have α ≤ −V ∗n(p, y), so that ∀q :
f(q) ≤ 〈y, q〉 − V ∗n(p, y).
The function V ∗n(p, y) is related the following dual game G
∗
n(p, y): At the
initial stage of this game, nature choses k with the lottery p and informs player
1. Contrarily to Gn(p, q), nature does not select l, but l is chosen privately
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by player 2. Then the game proceeds as in Gn(p, q), so that the strategies
σ for player 1 are the same as in Gn(p, q). For player 2 however, a strategy
in G∗n(p, y) is a pair (q, τ), with q ∈ ∆(L) and τ a strategy in Gn(p, q). The
payoff g∗n(p, y, σ, (q, τ)) paid by player 1 (the minimizer in G
∗
n(p, y)) to player
2 is then
g∗n(p, y, σ, (q, τ)) := 〈y, q〉 − gn(p, q, σ, τ).
Let us next define W n(p, y) = supq,τ infσ g
∗
n(p, y, σ, (q, τ)) and W n(p, y) =
infσ supq,τ g
∗
n(p, y, σ, (q, τ)).
We then have the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1. W n(p, y) = V
∗
n(p, y) and W n(p, y) = V
∗
n(p, y).
Proof: The following prove is designed to work with infinite action spaces:
the ”min-max” theorem used here is on vector payoffs instead of on strategies
σ. Let Y (p) be the convex set
Y (p) := {y ∈ RL|∃σ : ∀l : yl ≤ yl(p, σ)},
and let Y (p) be its closure in RL. Then
V n(p, q) = sup
σ
〈y(p, σ), q〉 = sup
y∈Y (p)
〈y, q〉 = sup
y∈Y (p)
〈y, q〉.
Now
W n(p, y) = inf
σ
sup
q
{
〈y, q〉 − inf
τ
gn(p, q, σ, τ)
}
= inf
σ
sup
q
〈y − y(p, σ), q〉
Since any z ∈ Y (p) is dominated by some y(p, σ), we find
W n(p, y) = inf
z∈Y (p)
sup
q
〈y − z, q〉 = inf
z∈Y (p)
sup
q
〈y − z, q〉
Next, we may apply the ”min-max” theorem for a bilinear functional with two
closed convex strategy strategy spaces, one of which is compact, and we get
thus
W n(p, y) = sup
q
inf
z∈Y (p)
〈y − z, q〉 = sup
q
{〈y, q〉 − V n(p, q)} = V ∗n(p, y)
On the other hand,
W n(p, y) = supq,τ infσ {〈y, q〉 − gn(p, q, σ, τ)}
= supq {〈y, q〉 − infτ supσ gn(p, q, σ, τ)}
= V
∗
n(p, y)
This concludes the proof.
We are now able to answer our previous question: Let σ be an optimal
strategy of player 1 in G∗n(p, y). Then, ∀q, τ : W n(p, y) ≥ 〈y, q〉 − gn(p, q, σ, τ),
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therefore, ∀q:
(5) 〈y(p, σ), q〉 = inf
τ
gn(p, q, σ, τ) ≥ 〈y, q〉 − V ∗n(p, y) ≥ f(q).
Let us finally remark that if, for some q, y ∈ ∂V n(p, q), then Fenchel lemma
indicates that Vn(p, q) = 〈y, q〉 − V ∗n(p, y), and the above inequality indicates
that σ guarantees V n(p, q) in Gn(p, q):
Theorem 2.2. Let y ∈ ∂V n(p, q), and let σ be an optimal strategy of player
1 in G∗n(p, y). Then σ is optimal in Gn(p, q).
This last result indicates how to get optimal strategies in the primal game,
having optimal strategies in the dual one.
3. The primal recursive formula
Let us come back on formula (1). Suppose σ1 is already fixed. Given an
array yi,j of vectors in RL, player 1 may decide to play σ+(i1, j1) an optimal
strategy in G∗n(p
i1 , yi1,j1). As indicates relation (5), for all strategy τ
+:
gn(p
i1 , qj1 , σ+(i1, j1), τ
+(i1, j1)) ≥ 〈y(pi1 , σ+(i1, j1)), qj1〉
≥ 〈yi1,j1 , qj1〉 − V ∗n(pi1 , yi1,j1)
and so, if yj :=
∑
i siyi,j, formula (1) gives:
gn+1(p, q, σ, τ) ≥ g1(p, q, σ1, τ1) +
∑
j1
tj1〈yj1 , qj1〉 −
∑
j1
tj1
∑
i1
si1V
∗
n(p
i1 , yi1,j1)
We now have to indicate how player 1 will chose the array yi,j. He will proceed
in two steps: suppose yj is fixed, he has then advantage to pick the yi,j among
the solutions of the following minimization problem Ψ(p, σ1, yj), where
Ψ(p, σ1, y) := inf
yi:y:=
P
i siyi
∑
i
siV
∗
n(p
i, yi)
Lemma 3.1. Let fp,σ1 be defined as the convex function
fp,σ1(q) :=
∑
i
siV n(p
i, q).
Then the problem Ψ(p, σ1, y) has optimal solutions and
(6) Ψ(p, σ1, y) = f
∗
p,σ1
(y).
Proof: First of all observe that ∀q : V ∗n(pi, yi) ≥ 〈yi, q〉 − V n(pi, q), and thus
Ψ(p, σ1, y) ≥ 〈y, q〉 − fp,σ1(q). This holds for all q, so Ψ(p, σ1, y) ≥ f ∗p,σ1(y).
On the other hand, let q∗ be a solution of the maximization problem:
sup
q
〈y, q〉 − fp,σ1(q),
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then y ∈ ∂fp,σ1(q∗). Now, the functions q → V n(pi, q) are finite on ∆(L), and
we conclude with Theoreme 23.8 in [6] that
(7) ∂fp,σ1(q
∗) =
∑
i
si∂V n(p
i, q∗).
In particular, there exists y∗i ∈ ∂V n(pi, q∗) such that y =
∑
i siy
∗
i . Now observe
that:
Ψ(p, σ1, y) ≤
∑
i siV
∗
n(p
i, y∗i )
=
∑
i si {〈y∗i , q∗〉 − V n(pi, q∗)}
= 〈y, q∗〉 − fp,σ1(q∗)
= f ∗p,σ1(y)
So both formula (6) and the optimality of y∗i are prooven.
Suppose thus that player one picks optimal yi,j in the problem Ψ(p, σ1, yj).
He guarantees then:
gn+1(p, q, σ, τ) ≥ g1(p, q, σ1, τ1) +
∑
j1
tj1〈yj1 , qj1〉 −
∑
j1
tj1f
∗
p,σ1
(yj1)
Next let Ajp,σ1 denote the L-dimensional with l-th component equal to
Ajp,σ1 :=
∑
k,i
pkσ1,k,iA
l,j
k,i.
With this definition, we get g1(p, q, σ1, τ1) =
∑
j1
tj1〈Aj1p,σ1 , qj1〉. Therefore:
gn+1(p, q, σ, τ) ≥
∑
j1
tj1〈Aj1p,σ1 + yj1 , qj1〉 −
∑
j1
tj1f
∗
p,σ1
(yj)
Suppose next that player 1 picks y ∈ RL, and plays yj1 := y − Aj1p,σ1 . Since∑
j tjq
j = q, the first sum in the last relation will then be independent of the
strategy τ1 of player 2. It follows:
(8)
gn+1(p, q, σ, τ) ≥ 〈y, q〉 −
∑
j1
tj1f
∗
p,σ1
(y − Aj1p,σ1)
≥ 〈y, q〉 − supj1 f ∗p,σ1(y − Aj1p,σ1)
We will next prove that choosing appropriate σ1 and y, player 1 can guar-
antee T (V n)(p, q):
gn+1(p, q, σ, τ) ≥ 〈y, q〉 − supt∈∆(J)
∑
j1
tj1f
∗
p,σ1
(y − Aj1p,σ1)
= 〈y, q〉 − sup
t∈∆(J)
r1...rJ ∈∆(L)
∑
j1
tj1
{〈y − Aj1p,σ1 , rj1〉 − fp,σ1(rj1)}
Let r denote
∑
j1
tj1r
j1 . The maximization over t, r can be split in a maxi-
mization over r ∈ ∆(L) and then a maximization over t, r with the constraint
r =
∑
j1
tj1r
j1 . This last maximization is clearly equivalent to a maximization
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over a strategy τ1 of player 2 in G1(p, r), inducing a probability λ on (J × L),
whose marginal on J is t and the conditional on L are the rj1 . In this way,∑
j1
tj1〈Aj1p,σ1 , rj1〉 = g1(p, r, σ1, τ1), and we get:
gn+1(p, q, σ, τ) ≥ inf
r
{〈y, q − r〉+H(p, σ1, r)}
where H(p, σ1, r) := infτ1
(
g1(p, r, σ1, τ1) +
∑
j1
tj1fp,σ1(r
j1)
)
. We will prove
in lemma 3.4 that H(p, σ1, r) is a convex function of r. If player 1 chooses
y ∈ ∂H(p, σ1, q) then ∀r: 〈y, q − r〉+H(p, σ1, r) ≥ H(p, σ1, q), and thus
gn+1(p, q, σ, τ) ≥ H(p, σ1, q)
Replacing now fp,σ1 by its value, we get:
(9) H(p, σ1, q) = inf
τ1
(
g1(p, q, σ1, τ1) +
∑
i1,j1
si1tj1V n(p
i1 , qj1)
)
Since player 1 can still maximize over σ1, we just have proved that player 1
can guarantee
(10) sup
σ1
H(p, σ1, q)
proceeding as follows:
(1) He first selects an optimal σ1 in (10), that is, an optimal strategy in
the problem T (V n)(p, q).
(2) He then computes the function r → H(p, σ1, r) and picks y ∈ ∂H(p, σ1, q).
(3) He next defines yj as yj = y−Ajp,σ1 and finds optimal yi,j in the problem
Ψ(p, σ1, yj) as in the proof of lemma 3.1.
(4) Finally, he selects σ+(i, j) an optimal strategy in G∗n(p, yi,j).
The next theorem is thus proved.
Theorem 3.2. With the above described strategy, player 1 guarantees T (V n)(p, q)
in Gn+1(p, q). Therefore: V n+1(p, q) ≥ T (V n)(p, q)
The first part of the proof of theorem 1.1 indicates that V n+1(p, q) ≤
T (V n)(p, q), and this result will hold even for games with infinite action spaces:
it uses no min-max argument. We may then conclude:
Corollary 3.3. V n+1(p, q) = T (V n)(p, q) and the above described strategy is
thus optimal in Gn+1(p, q).
It just remains for us to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.4. The function H(p, σ1, r) is convex in r.
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Proof: Let us denote ∆r the set of probabilities λ on (J × L), whose mar-
ginal λ|L on L is r. As mentioned above, a strategy τ1, joint to r, induces a
probability λ in ∆r, and conversely, any such λ is induced by some τ1.
Let next el be the l-th element of the canonical basis of RL. The mapping
e : l → el is then a random vector on (J × L), and rj1 = Eλ[e|j1]. Similarly,
the mapping Ap,σ1 : (l, j1) → Al,j1p,σ1 is a random variable and Eλ[Ap,σ1 ] =
g1(p, r, σ1, τ1). We get therefore
H(p, σ1, r) := inf
λ∈∆r
Eλ[Ap,σ1 + fp,σ1(Eλ[e|j1])].
Let now pi0, pi1 ≥ 0, with pi0 + pi1 = 1, let r0, r1, rpi ∈ ∆(L), with rpi = pi1r1 +
pi0r0. Let λu ∈ ∆ru , for u in {0, 1}. Then pi, λ1, λ0 induce a probability µ on
({0, 1}×J×L): first pick u at random in {0, 1}, with probability pi1 of u being
1. Then, conditionally to u, use the lottery λu to select (j1, l). The marginal
λpi of µ on (J × L) is obviously in ∆rpi . Next observe that, due to Jensen’s
inequality and the convexity of fp,σ1 :∑
u piuEλu [Ap,σ1 + fp,σ1(Eλu [e|j1])] = Eµ[Ap,σ1 + fp,σ1(Eλu [e|j1])]
= Eµ[Ap,σ1 + fp,σ1(Eµ[e|j1, u])]
≥ Eµ[Ap,σ1 + fp,σ1(Eµ[e|j1])]
= Eλpi [Ap,σ1 + fp,σ1(Eλpi [e|j1])]
≥ H(p, σ1, rpi)
Minimizing the left hand side in λ0 and λ1, we obtain:∑
u
piuH(p, σ1, ru) ≥ H(p, σ1, rpi)
and the convexity is thus prooved.
4. The dual recursive structure
The construction of the optimal strategy in Gn+1(p, q) of last section is not
completely satisfactory: the procedure ends up in point 4) by selecting optimal
strategies in the dual game G∗n(p, yi,j) but it does not explain how to construct
such strategies. The purpose of this section is to construct recursively optimal
strategies in the dual game. It turns out that this construction will be ”self-
contained” and truly recursive: finding optimal strategies in G∗n+1 will end up
in finding optimal strategies in G∗n.
Given σ1, let us consider the following strategy σ = (σ1, σ
+) in G∗n+1(p, y):
player 1 sets yj = y − Ajp,σ1 and finds optimal yi,j in the problem Ψ(p, σ1, yj)
as in the proof of lemma 3.1. He then plays σ+(i1, j1) an optimal strategy in
G∗n(p, yi1,j1). This is exactly what we prescribed for player 1 in the beginning
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of last section. In particular, this strategy was not depending on q in the last
section, so that inequality (8) holds for all q, τ :
sup
j1
f ∗p,σ1(y − Aj1p,σ1) ≥ 〈y, q〉 − gn+1(p, q, σ, τ) = g∗n+1(p, y, σ, (q, τ))
So, with lemma 3.1, and the definition of Ψ.
(11)
g∗n+1(p, y, σ, (q, τ)) ≤ supj1 f ∗p,σ1(y − Aj1p,σ1)
= supj1 Ψ(p, σ1, y − Aj1p,σ1)
= sup
j1
inf
yi:
P
i siyi=y−A
j1
p,σ1
∑
i siV
∗
n(p
i, yi)
= inf
yi,j :
P
i siyi,j=y−Ajp,σ1
sup
j1
∑
i siV
∗
n(p
i, yi,j1)
Notice that there is no ”min-max” theorem needed to derive the last equation:
We just allowed the variables yi to depend on j1: the new variables are yi,j.
With theorem 2.1, V ∗n(p
i, yi,j1) =W n(p
i, yi,j1). It is next convenient to define
mi,j := yi,j−y+Ajp,σ1 , so that
∑
i simi,j = 0, and to take mi,j as minimization
variables:
(12) g∗n+1(p, y, σ, (q, τ)) ≤ inf
mi,j :
P
i simi,j=0
sup
j1
∑
i1
si1W n(p
i1 , y −Aj1p,σ1 +mi1,j1)
Let still player 1 minimize this procedure over σ1. It follows:
Theorem 4.1. The above defined strategy σ guarantees T
∗
(W n)(p, y) to player
1 in G∗n+1(p, y), where, for a convex function W on (∆(K)× RL):
T
∗
(W )(p, y) := inf
σ1
mi,j :
P
i simi,j=0
sup
j1
∑
i1
si1W (p
i1 , y − Aj1p,σ1 +mi1,j1).
In particular: W n+1(p, y) ≤ T ∗(W n)(p, y)
We next will prove the following corollary:
Corollary 4.2. W n+1(p, y) = T
∗
(W n)(p, y) and the strategy σ is thus optimal
in G∗n+1(p, y).
Proof: If player 1 uses as strategy σ = (σ1, σ
+) in G∗n+1(p, y), player 2 may
reply the following strategy (q, τ), with τ = (τ1, τ
+): for a given choice of q, τ1,
he computes the a posteriori pi1 , qj1 and plays a best reply τ+(i1, j1) against
σ+(i1, j1) in Gn(p
i1 , qj1). Since
gn(p
i1 , qj1 , σ+(i1, j1), τ
+(i1, j1)) ≤ V n(pi1 , qj1),
we get
g∗n(p, y, σ, (q, τ)) ≥〈y, q〉 − g1(p, q, σ1, τ1)−
∑
i1,j1
si1tj1V n(p
i1 , qj1)
=
∑
j1
tj1
(〈y − Aj1p,σ1 , qj1〉 −∑i1 si1V n(pi1 , qj1))
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The reply (q, τ) of player 2 we will consider is that corresponding to the choice
of q, τ1 maximizing this last quantity. This turns out to be a maximization
over the joint law λ on (J × L). In turn, it is equivalent to a maximization
(t, qj1), without any constraint on
∑
j tjq
j. So:
g∗n(p, y, σ, (q, τ)) ≥ supt
∑
j1
tj1 supqj1
(〈y − Aj1p,σ1 , qj1〉 −∑i1 si1V n(pi1 , qj1))
= supj1 f
∗
p,σ1
(y − Aj1p,σ1).
We then derive as in equations (11) and (12) that
supj1 f
∗
p,σ1
(y − Aj1p,σ1) = inf
mi,j :
P
i simi,j=0
sup
j1
∑
i1
si1W n(p
i1 , y − Aj1p,σ1 +mi1,j1)
≥ T ∗(W n)(p, y)
So, with no strategy, player 1 will be able to guarantee a better payoff in
G∗n+1(y, p) than T
∗
(W n)(p, y), and the corollary is proved.
We thus gave a recursive procedure to construct optimal strategies in the
dual game. Now, instead of using the construction of the previous section
to play optimally in Gn+1(p, q), player 1 can use theorem 2.2: He picks y ∈
∂V n+1(p, q), and then plays optimally in G
∗
n+1(p, y), with the recursive proce-
dure introduced in this section.
5. Games with infinite action spaces
In this section, we generalize the previous results to games where I and J
are infinite sets. K and L are still finite sets. The sets I and J are then
equipped with σ-algebras I and J respectively. We will assume that ∀k, l, the
mapping (i, j) → Al,jk,i is bounded and measurable on (I ⊗ J ). The natural
σ-algebra on the set of histories Hm is then Hm := (I ⊗ J )⊗m. A behavior
strategy σ for player 1 in Gn(p, q) is then a n-uple (σ1, . . . , σn) of transition
probabilities σm from K ×Hm−1 to I which means: σm : (k, hm−1, A) ∈ (K ×
Hm−1 × I) → σm(k, hm−1)[A] ∈ [0, 1] satifying ∀k, hm−1: σm(k, hm−1)[·] is a
probability measure on (I, I), and ∀k,A, σm(k, hm−1)[A] is Hm measurable. A
strategy of player 2 is defined in a similar way. To each (p, q, σ, τ) corresponds
a unique probability measure Πn(p,q,σ,τ) on (K × L×Hn,P(K)⊗ P(L)⊗Hn).
Since the payoff map Al,jk,i is bounded and measurable, we are allowed to define
gn(p, q, σ, τ) := EΠn
(p,q,σ,τ)
[
∑n
m=1A
l,jm
k,im
]. The definitions of V n, V n, W n and W n
are thus exactly the same as in the finite case, and the a posteriori pi1 and qj1
are defined as the conditional probabilities of Π1(p,q,σ1,τ1) on K and L given i1
and j1. The sums in the definition of the recursive operators T and T are to
be replaced by expectations:
T (f)(p, q) = sup
σ1
inf
τ1
{
g1(p, q, σ1, τ1) + EΠ1
(p,q,σ1,τ1)
[f(pi1 , qj1)]
}
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Let V denote the set of Lipschitz functions f(p, q) on ∆(K)×∆(L) that are
concave in p and convex in q. The result we aim to prove in this section is the
next theorem. For all V ∈ V such that V n > V , we will provide strategies of
player 1 that guarantee him T (V ).
Theorem 5.1. If V n ≥ V , where V ∈ V, then V n+1 ≥ T (V ).
Proof: Since ∀² > 0, T (V − ²) = T (V )− ², it is sufficient to prove the result
for V < V n. In this case, we also have ∀p, y: V ∗(p, y) > V ∗n(p, y) =W n(p, y).
In the infinite games, optimal strategies may fail to exist. However, due to
the strict inequality, ∀p, y, there must exist a strategy σ+p,y in G∗n(p, y) that
warrantees strictly less than V ∗(p, y) to player 1. Since the payoffs map Al,jk,i is
bounded and V ∗ is continuous, the set O(p, y) of (p′, y′) ∈ ∆(K)×RL such that
σ+p,y warrantees V
∗(p′, y′) in G∗n(p
′, y′) is a neighborhood of (p, y). There exists
therefore a sequence {(pm, ym)}m∈N such that ∪m O(pm, ym) = ∆(K) × RL.
The map (p, y) → σ+(p, y) defined as σ+(p, y) := σ+pm∗ ,ym∗ , where m∗ is the
smallest integer m with (p, y) ∈ O(pm, ym) satisfies then
• for all `, the map (p, y) → σ+` (p, y)(k, h`−1) is a transition probability
from (∆(K)× RL ×K ×H`−1) to I.
• ∀p, y: σ+(p, y) warrantees V ∗(p, y) to player 1 in G∗n(p, y).
The argument of section 3 can now be adapted to this setting: Given a first
stage strategy σ1 and a measurable mapping y : (i1, j1)→ yi1,j1 ∈ RL, player 1
may decide to play σ+(pi1 , yi1,j1) from stage 2 on in Gn+1(p, q). Since σ
+(p, y)
warrantees V ∗(p, y) to player 1 in G∗n(p, y), we get
gn(p
i1 , qj1 , σ+(i1, j1), τ
+(i1, j1)) ≥ 〈yi1,j1 , qj1〉 − V ∗(pi1 , yi1,j1).
Let s and t denote the marginal distribution of i1 and j1 under Π
1
(p,q,σ1,τ1)
. In
the following Es[·] and Et[·] are short hand writings for
∫
I
·ds(i1) and
∫
J
·dt(j1).
If yj := Es[yi,j], formula (1) gives:
gn+1(p, q, σ, τ) ≥ g1(p, q, σ1, τ1) + Et
[〈yj1 , qj1〉 − Es[V ∗(pi1 , yi1,j1)]] .
As in section 3, player 1 would have advantage to choose i1 → yi1,j1 optimal
in the problem Ψ(p, σ1, yj1), where
Ψ(p, σ1, y) := inf
y:y:=Es[yi1 ]
Es[V
∗(pi1 , yi1)]
Lemma 3.1 also holds in this setting, with fp,σ1(q) := Es[V (p
i1 , q)]. The only
difficulty to adapt the prove of section 3 is to generalize equation (7). With the
Lipschitz property of V , we prove in theorem 5.3 that there exists a measurable
mapping y : i → RL satisfying Es[yi1 ] = y and for s-a.e i1: yi1 ∈ ∂V (pi1 , q∗).
We get in this way Ψ(p, σ1, y) = f
∗
p,σ1
(y).
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We next prove that for all measurable map y : j1 → yj1 , ∀² > 0, there exists
a measurable array y : (i1, j1)→ yi1,j1 such that ∀j1 : Es[yi1,j1 ] = yj1 and
(13) ∀j1 : Es[V ∗(pi1 , yi1,j1)] ≤ f ∗p,σ1(yj1) + ²
The function f ∗p,σ1 is Lipschitz, and we may therefore consider a triangulation
of RL in a countable number of L-dimensional simplices with small enough
diameter to insure that the linear interpolation f ∗p,σ1 of f
∗
p,σ1
at the extreme
points of a simplex S satisfies f ∗p,σ1 ≤ f ∗p,σ1 + ² on the interior of S. We define
then y(y, i) on S × I as the linear interpolation on S of optimal solutions of
Ψ(p, σ1, y) at the extreme points of the simplex S. Obviously Es[y(y, i1)] = y,
and, due to the convexity of V ∗, we get Es[V ∗(pi1 , y(y, i1))] ≤ f ∗p,σ1(y). The
array yi1,ji := y(yj1 , i1) will then satisfy (13).
With such arrays y, Player 1 guarantees up to an arbitrarily small ²:
inf
τ1
g1(p, q, σ1, τ1) + Et
[〈yj1 , qj1〉 − f ∗p,σ1(yj1)]
The proof next follows exactly as in section 3, replacing summations by
expectations.
As announced in the introduction, the last theorem has a corollary:
Corollary 5.2. If ∀V ∈ V : T (V ) = T (V ) ∈ V, then, ∀n, p, q, the game
Gn(p, q) has a value Vn(p, q), and Vn+1 = T (Vn) ∈ V.
Proof: The proof just consists of equation (2).
It remains for us to prove the next theorem:
Theorem 5.3. Let (Ω,A, µ) be probability space, let U be a convex subset of
RL, let f be a function Ω× U → R satisfying
• ∀ω : the mapping q → f(ω, q) is convex.
• ∃M : ∀q, q′, ω : |f(ω, q)− f(ω, q′)| ≤M |q − q′|.
• ∀q : the mapping ω → f(ω, q) is in L1(Ω,A, µ).
The function fµ(q) := Eµ[f(ω, q)] is then clearly convex and M-Lipschitz in q.
Let next y ∈ ∂fµ(q0).
Then there exists a measurable map y : Ω→ RL such that
1) for µ-a.e. ω : y(ω) ∈ ∂f(ω, q0).
2) y = Eµ[y(ω)]
Proof: Using a translation, there is no loss of generality to assume q0 = 0 ∈ U .
Then, considering the mapping g(ω, q) := f(ω, q) − f(ω, 0) − 〈y, q〉, and the
corresponding gµ(q) := Eµ[g(ω, q)], we get ∀ω : g(ω, 0) = 0 = gµ(0) and
∀q : gµ(q) ≥ 0.
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Let S denote the set of (α,X) where α and X are respectively R- and
RL-valued mappings in L1(Ω,A, µ). Let us then define
R := {(α,X) ∈ S|Eµ[α(ω)] > Eµ[g(ω,X(ω))]}
Our hypotheses on f imply in particular that the map ω → g(ω,X(ω)) is
A-measurable and in L1(Ω,A, µ). Furthermore the map X → Eµ[g(ω,X(ω))]
is continuous for the L1-norm, so that R is an open convex subset of S.
Let us next define the linear space T as:
T := {(α,X) ∈ S|Eµ[α(ω)] = 0, and ∃x ∈ RL such that µ-a.s. X(ω) = x}.
Now observe that R ∩ T = ∅. Would indeed (α,X) belong to R ∩ T , we
would have µ-a.s. X(ω) = x, and 0 = Eµ[α(ω)] > Eµ[g(ω,X(ω))] = gµ(x) ≥ 0.
There must therefore exist a linear functional φ on S such that
φ(R) > 0 = φ(T ).
Since the dual of L1 is L∞, there must exist a R-valued λ and a RL-valued Z
in L∞(Ω,A, µ) such that
∀(α,X) ∈ S : φ(α,X) = Eµ[λ(ω)α(ω)− 〈Z(ω), X(ω)〉].
From 0 = φ(T ), it is easy to derive that Eµ[Z(ω)] = 0 and that ∃λ ∈ R such
that µ-a.s. λ(ω) = λ.
Next, ∀² > 0, ∀X ∈ L1(Ω,A, µ), the pair (α,X) belongs to R, where
α(ω) := g(ω,X(ω)) + ². So, φ(R) > 0 with X ≡ 0, implies in particular
λ > 0, and φ may be normalized so as to take λ = 1. Finally, we get ∀² > 0,
∀X ∈ L1(Ω,A, µ): Eµ[g(ω,X(ω))] + ² > Eµ[〈Z(ω), X(ω)〉] and thus, ∀X ∈
L1(Ω,A, µ): Eµ[g(ω,X(ω))] ≥ Eµ[〈Z(ω), X(ω)〉].
For A ∈ A and x ∈ RL, we may apply the last inequality toX(ω) := 1A(ω)x,
and we get: Eµ[1Ag(ω, x)] ≥ Eµ[1A〈Z(ω), x〉]. Therefore, for all x ∈ RL:
µ(Ωx) = 1, where Ωx = {ω ∈ Ω : g(ω, x) ≥ 〈Z(ω), x〉}. So, if Ω′ := ∩x∈QLΩx,
we get µ(Ω′) = 1, since QL is a countable set, and ∀ω ∈ Ω′, ∀x ∈ QL:
g(ω, x) ≥ 〈Z(ω), x〉. Due to the continuity of g(ω, .), the last inequality holds
in fact for all ∀x ∈ RL, so that ∀ω ∈ Ω′ : Z(ω) ∈ ∂g(ω, 0).
Hence, if we define y(ω) := y + Z(ω), we get µ-a.s.: y(ω) ∈ ∂f(ω, 0) and
Eµ[y(ω)] = y + Eµ[Z(ω)] = y. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
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